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I. Introduction
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act)1 gives
employees the right “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.”2 When President Roosevelt signed the Act into law in
1935, few could have imagined the new contexts in which
“concerted activities” would arise. The Act’s drafters envisioned a
workplace in which employees communicated with each other in
person. Employee communication is no longer so limited,
however. Facebook and other social networking websites have
altered this traditional water cooler model, creating new spaces
in which employees interact.
With these new spaces come new questions. Chief among
them is how the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board)3 should apply the Act’s concerted activity provision in
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)). The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Act in NLRB. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
3. The Board is an independent agency created by the NLRA. Id. § 153;
see also NLRB, Who We Are, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are (last visited Sept.
27, 2012) (“The National Labor Relations Board is an independent federal
agency that protects the rights of private sector employees to join together, with
or without a union, to improve their wages and working conditions.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). When this Note refers to the Board
in Part I and Parts III–VI, it is referring to the agency as a whole. It is not
referring to the five-member, quasi-judicial body within the agency, unless
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cases involving a virtual water cooler. Do existing standards for
defining concerted activity make sense when applied in the social
media context, or should the NLRB alter them to better comport
with the realities of contemporary interaction? Facebook firing
cases—cases in which an employer fires an employee because of a
Facebook posting—provide insight.
Adapting the present concerted activity standard for
application in Facebook firing cases has presented the Board with
numerous challenges. The source of these challenges is the very
nature of social media; the forum itself makes it more difficult to
distinguish reasonably between activity that is concerted and
activity that is not. Furthermore, the forum alters the calculus of
interest balancing in which the Board must engage to effectuate
the Act’s purposes. While the Board has attempted to clarify how
social media will fit into existing doctrine, uncertainty remains.
This Note examines why uncertainty remains and offers
three temporally based approaches to remedy the uncertainty.
Part II of this Note explores the Board’s present interpretation of
concerted activity. Part III details how entities within the Board
have applied the standard in Facebook firing cases. Part IV
examines why the application of the standard in Facebook firing
cases is problematic. Part V suggests three approaches that the
Board should consider: promulgating a model social media policy;
identifying factors that tend to indicate concertedness in the
social media context; and applying a more stringent loss-ofprotection standard to cases involving social media. These
approaches are not mutually exclusive and recognize both the
unique attributes of the social media context and the interests
that the context implicates.
II. The Development of the Present Concerted Activity Standard
A. The Statutory Language
As is often the case, the heart of the issue lies in the
ambiguity of statutory language. Section 7 of the NLRA states:
otherwise indicated. See NLRB, The Board, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/board (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (describing the five-member board) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.”4 In the list of employee rights,
the right “to engage in other concerted activities” provides the
most room for interpretation and, consequently, confusion. This
confusion is problematic because understanding what constitutes
concerted activity is a precondition for employees and employers
to understand the scope of their rights and obligations.5
Section 7’s language and the placement of the concerted
activity phrase within the Section provide some insight into the
meaning of concerted activity. First, the use of “other” in the
phrase “and to engage in other concerted activities” suggests that
the activities enumerated before the phrase—self-organizing;
forming, joining, or assisting labor organizations; and bargaining
collectively through representatives—are themselves examples of
concerted activities.6 Second, it appears that Congress intended
for some unenumerated activities to fall within Section 7.
Otherwise, the phrase would be unnecessary. Thus, Section 7’s
language and structure indicate that the activities fitting within
the phrase’s scope are similar to, yet different from, those
activities that Congress enumerated specifically. Because neither
Section 7, nor its legislative history, defines concerted activity
explicitly,7 the Board has interpreted the Section and divined its
own definition, while keeping in mind the Act’s purposes.8
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added). Section 7 of the NLRA corresponds
to 29 U.S.C. § 157.
5. Section 8 of the NLRA makes the rights set out in Section 7
enforceable: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 8 of the NLRA corresponds to 29
U.S.C. § 158.
6. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 n.8 (1984)
(“Section 7 lists . . . activities initially and concludes the list with the phrase
‘other concerted activities,’ thereby indicating that the enumerated activities are
deemed to be ‘concerted.’”).
7. See id. at 830 (stating that the Act does not define concerted activity);
see also Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 493 (1984) (stating
that the Act’s legislative history does not contain a definition).
8. The Act’s purposes are set forth in its preamble and include
“encouraging . . . collective bargaining and . . . protecting the exercise by
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B. The Board’s Interpretation of the Statutory Language
The present definition of concerted activity originates from
Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers I).9 In Meyers I, the Board
adopted what it described as “the ‘objective’ standard of concerted
activity.”10 The Board contrasted the objective standard with
what it deemed the “per se standard of concerted activity,”11 the
standard the Board employed before Meyers I. The Board
enunciated the per se standard ten years earlier in Alleluia
Cushion Co.12 It applied to cases in which “an employee [spoke]
up and [sought] to enforce statutory provisions relating to
occupational safety designed for the benefit of all employees.”13 In
those circumstances, the Board stated: “[I]n the absence of any
evidence that fellow employees disavow such representation, we
will find an implied consent thereto and deem such activity to be
concerted.”14 Because Alleluia did not require an outward
manifestation of group involvement or support, the Board later
characterized this as the per se standard of concerted activity.15
Meyers I firmly rejected this standard,16 defining concerted
activity as follows: “[T]o find an employee’s activity to be
‘concerted,’ we shall require that it be engaged in with or on the
authority of the other employees, and not solely by and on behalf

workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (2006).
9. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984).
10. Id. at 496.
11. See id. at 493–97 (describing both standards of concerted activity).
12. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B 999 (1975).
13. Id. at 1000.
14. Id.
15. See Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 495 (1984) (“Under the Alleluia
analytical framework, the Board questioned whether the purpose of the activity
was one it wished to protect and . . . deemed the activity ‘concerted,’ without
regard to its form.”).
16. See id. at 496 (“[W]e hold that the concept of concerted activity first
enunciated in Alleluia does not comport with the principles inherent in Section
7 of the Act.”). The Board then overruled Alleluia. Id. Rather than enunciating
an entirely new standard, the Board asserted that it was simply returning to
the pre-Alleluia standard. Id. at 496–97.
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of the employee himself.”17 Determining whether an activity
meets this standard requires a highly factual inquiry.18 Applying
this standard to Meyers I’s facts, the Board found that a truck
driver was not engaged in concerted activity when he
(1) complained to his employer and state authorities that his
truck was unsafe; (2) contacted the Tennessee Public Service
Commission to arrange a vehicle inspection after getting into an
accident; and (3) refused to drive the truck after the accident.19
According to the Board, rather than engaging in concerted
activity, the employee was acting alone.20
In Prill v. NLRB,21 the D.C. Circuit addressed Meyers I’s
definition of concerted activity.22 Although the court
acknowledged the deference due to the Board,23 it found that “the
Board act[ed] pursuant to an erroneous view of the law . . . when
it decided that its new definition of ‘concerted activities’ was
mandated by the NLRA.”24 In addition, the court found that the
Board misread some of its own precedent.25 Consequently, the
court remanded the case, instructing the Board to reconsider its
Meyers I definition because it rested “on a faulty legal premise
and [was] without adequate rationale.”26
17. Id. at 497. To establish a violation of Section 8 of the NLRA, an
employee must also show that “the employer knew of the concerted nature of the
employee’s activity, the concerted activity was protected by the Act, and the
adverse employment action . . . was motivated by the employee’s protected
concerted activity.” Id.
18. See id. (“[T]he question of whether an employee engaged in concerted
activity is, at its heart, a factual one . . . .”).
19. Id. at 498.
20. See id. (“Prill [the employee] acted solely on his own behalf.”).
21. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
22. Id. at 948–50.
23. See id. at 942 (“The Board has been granted broad authority to construe
the NLRA in light of its expertise.”). In particular, the D.C. Circuit
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems,
Inc., in which the Court stated that the Board’s interpretation of the Act, if
reasonable, “is entitled to considerable deference.” NLRB v. City Disposal Sys.,
Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984).
24. Prill, 755 F.2d at 942. Thus, the D.C. Circuit asserted that the Board
“fail[ed] to exercise the discretion delegated to it by Congress.” Id.
25. See id. at 953–56 (challenging the Board’s assertion that the Meyers I
definition represented a return to the pre-Alleluia definition).
26. Id. at 942. The court stressed that it was not suggesting that the
Meyers I definition was incorrect. See id. (“We express no opinion as to the
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Nevertheless, in Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers II),27 the
Board reaffirmed the Meyers I standard.28 While addressing the
D.C. Circuit’s concerns, the Board clarified the standard, offering
more insight into what constitutes concerted activity. First, the
Board stressed that the standard “requires some linkage to group
action.”29 Notably, however, the Board emphasized that an
individual employee’s act can constitute concerted activity.30
While explaining when individual action falls within Section 7,
the Board stated: “[O]ur definition of concerted activity in Meyers
I encompasses those circumstances where individual employees
seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well
as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the
attention of management.”31 The Board applied this clarified
standard to Meyers I’s facts, once again finding that the employee
did not engage in concerted activity but instead “acted alone and
without an intent to enlist the support of other employees.”32
Therefore, the Board affirmed its dismissal of the employee’s
complaint.33
III. The Application of the Meyers I Standard in the Social
Media Context
The advancement of technology and the growth of employee
use of technology have presented—and continue to present—
numerous challenges. Technology has required the NLRB to
correct test of ‘concerted activities’ . . . .”).
27. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986).
28. See id. at 889 (“The Board has reconsidered this case . . . and has
decided to adhere to the Meyers I definition of concerted activity as a reasonable
construction of Section 7 of the Act.”).
29. Id. at 884.
30. See id. at 885 (“There is nothing in the Meyers I definition that states
that conduct engaged in by a single employee at one point in time can never
constitute concerted activity within the meaning of Section 7.”).
31. Id. at 887. In addition, the Board reaffirmed its so-called “Interboro
doctrine”: an individual employee who reasonably and honestly invokes a
collective bargaining right is engaged in concerted activity. Id. at 884–85; see
also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 841 (1984) (approving of the
Interboro doctrine as a reasonable interpretation of the Act).
32. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 888.
33. Id. at 889.
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determine how to adapt the NLRA to a modern reality in which
employee communication is fundamentally different than it was
seventy-five years ago.34 This adaption process has involved a
difficult task: attempting to “maintain[] stability in the law while
simultaneously allowing for flexibility to address these new
developments.”35 Most recently, social media has presented the
Board with an opportunity to consider these competing values—
stability and flexibility—for the purpose of balancing the
competing interests at stake.36
When confronting new issues, administrative agencies like
the NLRB have two tools at their disposal: rulemaking and
adjudication. Because agencies often lack ready answers to the
questions that emerging issues present, adjudication provides a
vehicle to explore those issues, formulate an approach, and
develop a rationale. In SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II),37 the
Supreme Court characterized this process as a necessary and
valuable supplement to agencies’ rulemaking authority.38 When
explaining why an agency could reasonably prefer to address an
issue through adjudication, the Court stated: “Not every principle
essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should
be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some
principles must await their own development, while others must
be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations.”39 Thus
far, the NLRB has chosen to confront the issues presented by
social media through adjudication.
34. See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor
Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (2000) (“For six and one-half decades, the National Labor
Relations Board and the courts have been developing and refining doctrine
under the National Labor Relations Act in the context of traditional physically
defined workplaces.”).
35. Gwynne A. Wilcox, Section 7 Rights of Employees and Union Access to
Employees: Cyber Organizing, 16 LAB. LAW. 253, 253 (2000).
36. See Malin & Perritt, supra note 34, at 62 (“Adapting the NLRA to
electronic workplaces will continue a process of balancing employee rights to
engage in concerted activities against employer property and entrepreneurial
rights.”).
37. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
38. See id. at 203 (“There is . . . a very definite place for the case-by-case
evolution of statutory standards.”).
39. Id. at 202.
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By late 2011, the Board had reviewed approximately 130
cases involving social media, all existing at varying stages of
development.40 The Board’s involvement in Facebook firing cases,
in particular, began on October 27, 2010, when Region 34 of the
NLRB issued a complaint against a Connecticut ambulance
company in American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.41 The
complaint alleged, in part, that a company employee who
criticized her supervisor on Facebook engaged in concerted
activity, and that the company terminated her employment
because of her Facebook postings.42 Because this case, and many
subsequent cases, settled prior to adjudication,43 guidance on how
the Board will treat cases involving the intersection of labor law
and social media is lacking. In addition, guidance is lacking
because many of these cases have not yet progressed past the
initial stages of development.44
40. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES BEFORE
NLRB (2011), www.uschamber.com/reports/survey-social-media-issues-nlrb
(last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
This number includes decisions by the five-member board, ALJ decisions,
settlement agreements, complaints, memoranda, and charges that contain social
media components. Id. It includes a broader range of factual circumstances than
is the focus of this Note: concerted activity in the context of Facebook.
41. Complaint & Notice of Hearing, Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc.,
N.L.R.B.
No.
34-CA-12576
(Region
34
Oct.
27,
2010),
http://
documents.jdsupra.com/daf37177-f935-4fe0-be1f-82c65d0f2ac3.pdf. Typically, a
case proceeds through the following stages: First, the employee or the
employee’s representative files a charge—“a one-page form alleging that an
employer or union has committed an unfair labor practice”—with one of the
Board’s regional offices. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, at 3.
Second, the regional office investigates and “makes a determination as to
whether the charge has merit.” Id. If the regional office finds that the charge
has merit, it issues a complaint, and the parties either settle the case, or the
case proceeds to adjudication. Id. The NLRB has thirty-two regional offices.
NLRB, Regional Offices, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices (last
visited Sept.27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. Complaint & Notice of Hearing, Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc.,
N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576, at 3–4.
43. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, at 2; see also Press
Release, NLRB, Settlement Reached in Case Involving Discharge for Facebook
Comments (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/settlement-reached-caseinvolving-discharge-facebook-comments (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“A
settlement has been reached in a case involving the discharge of a Connecticut
ambulance service employee for posting negative comments about a supervisor
on her Facebook page.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, at 1.
THE
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Nevertheless, some guidance exists. Of particular importance
are two reports: one issued by the Board’s Acting General
Counsel on August 18, 2011 (First NLRB Report or First
Report)45 and one issued by the Board’s Acting General Counsel
on January 24, 2012 (Second NLRB Report or Second Report).46
The First Report “presents recent case developments arising in
the context of today’s social media,” including “issues concerning
the protected and/or concerted nature of employees’ Facebook and
Twitter postings.”47 After the Acting General Counsel issued the
First Report, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs)48 heard the first
three Facebook firing cases: Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.,49
Karl Knauz Motors, Inc.,50 and Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille.51
45.

NLRB OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, REPORT
ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011)
[hereinafter FIRST NLRB REPORT], www.nlrb.gov/publications/operationsmanagement-memos (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). The First NLRB Report does not contain page numbers,
so they have been assigned: the first page is number one and the last page is
number twenty-four. See also NLRB, The General Counsel, http://www.nlrb.gov/
who-we-are/general-counsel (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“The General Counsel,
appointed by the President to a 4-year term, is independent from the [fivemember board] and is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of unfair
labor practice cases and for the general supervision of the NLRB field offices in
the processing of cases.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. NLRB OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OM 12-31, REPORT
OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2012)
[hereinafter SECOND NLRB REPORT], www.nlrb.gov/publications/operationsmanagement-memos (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
47. FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 2.
48. ALJs are Article I judges who are similar to “trial court judges hearing
a case without a jury.” NLRB, Administrative Law Judge Decisions,
http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/case-decisions/administrative-law-judgedecisions (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). After a regional office issues a complaint, an ALJ “hears the case and
issues a decision and recommendation order.” Id.
49. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL
3894520 (Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011). See infra Part III.C.1.
50. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437
(Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011). See infra Part III.C.2.
51. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, 2012 WL
76862 (Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012). See infra Part III.C.3. Although the
respondent in this case is Three D, LLC d/b/a Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille,
this Note will refer to the case as “Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille” or “Triple
Play” because it is commonly referred to by those names.
OF THE
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Following these cases, the Acting General Counsel issued the
Second Report, which discusses cases containing “emerging
issues in the context of social media.”52 These two reports, along
with the ALJ cases, provide insight into how the Board will treat
future Facebook firing cases.53
A. The First NLRB Report
The First NLRB Report contains summaries of fourteen cases
involving social media, nine of which pertain to the concerted
nature of online postings.54 In addition, the First Report discusses
whether the General Counsel’s Division of Advice (Division of
Advice) found each case meritorious.55 Its purpose, as stated by
52. SECOND NLRB REPORT, supra note 46, at 2.
53. On May 30, 2012, the Acting General Counsel issued a third report
(Third NLRB Report or Third Report) discussing social media cases. See NLRB
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2012) [hereinafter THIRD
NLRB REPORT], www.nlrb.gov/publications/operations-management-memos (last
visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Unlike the first two reports, the Third NLRB Report focuses solely on social
media policies and rules. Id. at 2. Although this Note touches on the Board’s role
in providing guidance in this area, the Board’s analysis of social media policies
and rules is not the focus of this Note. See Part V.A (discussing the connection
between providing guidance in the area of social media policies and rules and
solving the concerted activity problem). Thus, this Note does not discuss the
Third Report in-depth.
54. FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45 (citing Triple Play Sports Bar &
Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915 (Div. of Advice); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc.,
N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452 (Div. of Advice); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.,
N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872 (Div. of Advice); Martin House, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA12950, 2011 WL 3223853 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011); Wal-Mart, N.L.R.B. No.
17-CA-25030, 2011 WL 3223852 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011); JT’s Porch
Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46689, 2011 WL 2960964 (Div. of
Advice July 7, 2011); Rural Metro, N.L.R.B. No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 WL 2960970
(Div. of Advice June 29, 2011); Lee Enters., Inc. N.L.R.B. No. 28-CA-23267 (Div.
of Advice Apr. 21, 2011); Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA12576 (Div. of Advice Oct. 5, 2010)). One of the nine cases—Lee Enterprises,
Inc.—involves the concerted nature of Twitter postings and is included in the
discussion because it implicates similar issues. The five other cases involve
matters beyond the scope of this Note. Furthermore, the First Report does not
identify explicitly the cases that it discusses. This was determined
independently.
55. Id. The First Report states that the cases it discusses “were decided
upon a request for advice from a Regional Director.” Id. at 2. When a regional
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the Board’s Acting General Counsel, Lafe Solomon, is to
“encourage compliance with the Act and cooperation with Agency
personnel” by “keep[ing] the labor-management community fully
aware of the activities of [his] office.”56
1. When Concerted Activity Was Present
The Division of Advice found that concerted activity existed
in four of the nine cases. Three of these four cases—Hispanics
United, Karl Knauz Motors, and Triple Play—went on to become
the first Facebook firing cases heard by an ALJ.57 The other
case—American Medical—settled.58 Thus, the First Report and
the Advice Memorandum it summarizes contain the only existing
analysis of American Medical.
In American Medical, the Division of Advice found that an
employee engaged in concerted activity when she posted negative
comments about her supervisor on her Facebook page.59 The
employee posted the comments after her employer denied her
request for a union representative to assist her in the preparation
of a written incident report.60 Coworkers responded to the
postings, and eventually the employee was terminated.61 Because
the employee “discuss[ed] supervisory actions with coworkers in
her Facebook post,”62 the Division of Advice found that her
activity was both protected and concerted.63

office receives a charge, it may request advice from the Division of Advice if the
charge presents a difficult or novel legal issue. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
supra note 40, at 4. The Division of Advice prepares Advice Memoranda, which
“evaluate the facts of particular cases and advise the regional office where the
charge originated whether it should issue a complaint.” Id.
56. FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 2.
57. See infra Part III.C.1–3.
58. See Press Release, NLRB, supra note 43 (discussing the settlement).
59. FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 5–6 (citing Am. Med. Response
of Conn., Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576 (Div. of Advice Oct. 5, 2010)). For
example, she called her supervisor a “scumbag.” Id. at 5.
60. Id. The incident report concerned a customer complaint. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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2. When Concerted Activity Was Not Present
The Division of Advice found that there was no concerted
activity in five of the nine cases. For example, in Lee Enterprises,
Inc.,64 the Division of Advice found that an employee’s Twitter
postings did not constitute concerted activity.65 The case involved
a newspaper reporter who created a Twitter account after his
employer, a newspaper company, encouraged him to do so.66 After
creating the account, he posted tweets criticizing his copy editors
and a local television station.67 In addition, he posted tweets
concerning local homicides and others containing sexual
content.68 In finding that his eventual termination did not violate
the Act, the Division of Advice stated that the employee’s
“conduct was not protected and concerted: it did not relate to the
terms and conditions of his employment or seek to involve other
employees in issues related to employment.”69
Likewise, in JT’s Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd.,70 the Division
of Advice found that an employee’s Facebook posting did not
constitute concerted activity.71 In response to a question posed by
his stepsister, the employee, a bartender, expressed frustration
with his employer’s tipping policy.72 Although the employee had
previously discussed his concerns about the tipping policy with a
coworker, the Division of Advice found that the posting was not
concerted because the employee “did not discuss the posting with
his coworkers, and none of them responded to the posting.”73

64. Id. at 12–14 (citing Lee Enters., Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 28-CA-23267 (Div. of
Advice Apr. 21, 2011)).
65. Id. at 13.
66. See id. at 12 (“[T]he [e]mployer encouraged employees . . . to use social
media to get news stories out . . . .”).
67. Id. at 12–13.
68. Id. at 13.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 14–15 (citing JT’s Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., N.L.R.B. No. 13CA-46689, 2011 WL 2960964 (Div. of Advice July 7, 2011)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 14. The employee’s sister responded in agreement, saying that
the policy “sucked.” Id.
73. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
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In Rural Metro,74 the Division of Advice found that a person’s
Facebook posting on a United States Senator’s Facebook page did
not constitute concerted activity.75 After the Senator made a
Facebook posting concerning federal grants to fire departments,
the person, who worked for a company that contracted with fire
departments, responded by complaining about her wages and the
way that the state handled emergency medical services.76
Although the employee “had discussed wages with other
employees after [her] [e]mployer had announced a wage cap,” the
Division of Advice found that the posting was not concerted,
emphasizing the fact that “she did not discuss her posting with
any other employee.”77
In Martin House,78 the Division of Advice found that an
employee of a nonprofit facility for homeless people was not
engaged in concerted activity when she posted comments about
the facility’s mentally disabled clients on her Facebook page.79
Because the employee “did not discuss her Facebook posts with
any of her fellow employees” and “none of her coworkers
responded to the posts,” the activity was not concerted.80
Finally, in Wal-Mart,81 the Division of Advice found that a
Wal-Mart employee who posted comments critical of the store’s
management was not engaged in concerted activity, even though
several coworkers responded to the postings.82 The Division of
Advice emphasized that the postings were “expression[s] of an
individual gripe.”83 The coworkers’ responses did not make the
74. Id. at 15–16 (citing Rural Metro, N.L.R.B. No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 WL
2960970 (Div. of Advice June 29, 2011)).
75. Id. at 16.
76. Id. at 15.
77. Id. at 15–16 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 16–17 (citing Martin House, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL
3223853 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011)).
79. Id. For example, the employee “stated that it was spooky being alone
overnight in a mental institution, that one client was cracking her up, and that
[she] did not know whether the client was laughing at her, with her, or at the
client’s own voices.” Id.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. 17–18 (citing Wal-Mart, N.L.R.B. No. 17-CA-25030, 2011 WL
3223852 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Facebook activity concerted because the responses “merely
indicated that [the coworkers] had found the employee’s first
posting humorous, asked why the employee was so ‘wound up,’ or
offered emotional support.”84
3. What the Cases in the First Report Tell Us
Although the General Counsel did not identify explicitly the
factors that the Division of Advice considered when evaluating
concertedness in the social media context, the Division of Advice
considered certain factors regularly in its analysis. Such factors
include: (1) whether the posting grew out of prior non-Facebook
group activity,85 (2) whether the posting contemplated future nonFacebook group activity,86 (3) whether coworkers responded to
the posting,87 (4) whether the employee who made the posting
discussed the posting itself with coworkers,88 (5) the intent of the
84. Id.
85. See Martin House, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL 3223853, at *2
(Div. of Advice July 19, 2011) (“[H]er activity was not an outgrowth of the
employees’ collective concerns.”); Wal-Mart, N.L.R.B. No. 17-CA-25030, 2011
WL 3223852, at *2 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011) (finding no “evidence that
establishes that the Charging Party’s postings were the logical outgrowth of
prior group activity”); JT’s Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA46689, 2011 WL 2960964, at *2 (Div. of Advice July 7, 2011) (“[T]his internet
‘conversation’ did not grow out [of] his prior conversation with a fellow
bartender months earlier about the tipping policy.”).
86. See Martin House, 2011 WL 3223853, at *2 (“[T]he Charging Party was
not seeking to induce or prepare for group action . . . .”); Wal-Mart, 2011 WL
3223852, at *2 (“They [the postings] contain no language suggesting the
Charging Party sought to initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group
action. . . .”).
87. See Martin House, 2011 WL 3223853, at *2 (“[N]one of her coworkers
responded to the posts.”); JT’s Porch, 2011 WL 2960964, at *2 (“[N]one of his
coworkers responded to the posting.”); Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc.,
N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576, at 9 (Div. of Advice Oct. 5, 2010) (characterizing the
Facebook activity as a “discussion” because coworkers responded to the
employee’s postings).
88. See Martin House, 2011 WL 3223853, at *2 (“The Charging Party did
not discuss her Facebook posts with any of her fellow employees . . . .”); JT’s
Porch, 2011 WL 2960964, at *2 (“[H]e did not discuss his Facebook posting with
any of his fellow employees either before or after he wrote it . . . .”); Rural Metro,
N.L.R.B. No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 WL 2960970, at *2 (Div. of Advice June 29,
2011) (“The Charging Party did not discuss her Facebook posting with any other
employee . . . either before or immediately thereafter.”).
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employee who made the posting, as reflected by the language and
context of the posting,89 and (6) how coworkers interpreted the
posting, as reflected by their responses.90
Factors one and two relate closely to the standard developed
in Meyers I and its progeny: if individual action grows out of prior
group action or prepares for future group action, it is likely
concerted.91 One question unique to the social media context is
whether the Facebook activity in question must be an outgrowth
of, or preparation for, in-person group activity, or whether it can
be an outgrowth of, or preparation for, additional online group
activity. The Division of Advice’s analysis suggests that a lack of
connection to in-person group activity will weigh against finding
that Facebook activity is concerted.92
As factors three and four indicate, the Division of Advice
focused not only on the original posting and the person who made
it, but also on whether coworkers became involved in the posting.
The Division of Advice examined two forms of involvement:
whether coworkers responded to the posting online and whether
the posting itself became a topic of in-person conversation.93
Typically, the Division of Advice focused on the absence of these
89. See Martin House, 2011 WL 3223853, at *2 (finding the postings
revealed the employee’s intent to “communicat[e] with her personal friends
about what was happening on her shift”); Wal-Mart, 2011 WL 3223852, at *2
(finding the postings revealed the employee’s intent to “express . . . his
frustration regarding his individual dispute with the Assistant Manager”); JT’s
Porch, 2011 WL 2960964, at *2 (finding the postings revealed the employee’s
intent to “respond[] to a question from his step-sister about how his evening at
work went”); Rural Metro, 2011 WL 2960970, at *2 (finding the postings
revealed the employee’s intent “to make a public official aware of the state of
emergency medical services in Indiana”).
90. See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 2011 WL 3223852, at *2 (finding that coworkers’
responses were reactions to an individual gripe rather than the beginning of
group action). For example, the Division of Advice characterized a coworker’s
“‘hang in there’-type comment” as suggesting that the coworker viewed the
employee’s “postings to be a plea for emotional support.” Id.
91. See NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 53 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1995)
(stating that individual action may be concerted when it is a “‘logical outgrowth’
of prior concerted activity”); see also Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986)
(stating that “individual employees seek[ing] to initiate or to induce or to
prepare for group action” may be involved in concerted activity).
92. See supra notes 85–86.
93. See supra notes 87–88. Discussion of a posting can occur within a
conversation about common concerns, or it can provide a means of entering into
a conversation about common concerns.
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factors, which are objective in nature, when finding that
Facebook activity was not concerted.94 In contrast, when the
Division of Advice found that Facebook activity was concerted, it
put less of an emphasis on whether coworkers discussed the
posting itself with each other in person. Perhaps this is because
in the cases in which the Division of Advice found concertedness,
coworkers usually responded to the original posting by making
postings of their own.95 Thus, their responses reflected knowledge
of the original posting, and an examination of whether the
original posting was a topic of in-person conversation became
unnecessary. Even so, when finding concerted activity, the
Division of Advice tended to address the significance of coworker
responses only implicitly—by characterizing the Facebook
activity as a “discussion” or “conversation” when coworkers
responded—rather than stating clearly that coworker responses
indicated concertedness.96
Factors five and six represent an implicit focus in the
Division of Advice’s analysis on the subjective intent of those
involved in the Facebook activity. In each case, the Division of
Advice analyzed what the person who made the posting was
“seeking to” or “trying to” do.97 Likewise, it looked at coworkers’
responses to discern how they interpreted the posting: whether
their responses reflected an intent to participate in group action
or simply conveyed, for example, that they found the posting
amusing.98

94. See, e.g., Martin House, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL 3223853,
at *2 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011) (finding that the Facebook activity was not
concerted in part because “[t]he Charging Party did not discuss her Facebook
posts with any of her fellow employees, and none of her coworkers responded to
the posts”).
95. See, e.g., Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576,
at 3–4 (Div. of Advice Oct. 5, 2010) (listing coworker responses).
96. See, e.g., id. at 9 (characterizing the online activity as a “discussion” of
supervisory actions).
97. See, e.g., Wal-Mart, N.L.R.B. No. 17-CA-25030, 2011 WL 3223852, at *2
(Div. of Advice July 19, 2011) (“They [the postings] contain no language
suggesting the Charging Party sought to initiate or induce coworkers to engage
in group action; rather they express only his frustration regarding his individual
dispute . . . .”) (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., id. (“Employee 1 merely indicated that he found Charging
Party’s first Facebook posting humorous . . . .”).
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Although it is possible to identify factors that the Division of
Advice considered regularly, it is difficult to discern the weight
that the Division of Advice attributed to each factor. The Division
of Advice neither attributed a uniform weight to each factor nor
indicated which factor(s) it considered more heavily than the
others.
B. The Second NLRB Report
Like the First Report, the Second NLRB Report contains
summaries of cases involving social media, ten of which include a
discussion of the concerted nature of Facebook postings.99
Because, as the Board’s Acting General Counsel acknowledged,
the issues raised by these cases “continue to be a ‘hot topic’
among practitioners, human resource professionals, the media,
and the public,” the Second Report’s purpose is to continue “to
provide guidance as this area of law develops.”100
1. When Concerted Activity Was Present
The Division of Advice found that concerted activity existed
in five of the ten cases. For example, in Case A,101 the Division of
Advice found that an employee engaged in concerted activity
when she posted a status update on her Facebook page about her
employer.102 The employee made the posting after her employer
99. SECOND NLRB REPORT, supra note 46 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr.,
N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA-36658 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011); Frito-Lay, Inc.,
N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-10882 (Div. of Advice Sept. 19, 2011); Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B.
No. 11-CA-22936 (Div. of Advice July 28, 2011); Case A; Case B; Case C; Case D;
Case E: Case F; Case G). The NLRB does not release all Advice Memoranda to
the public. See NLRB, Advice Memos http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/advicememos (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“Two categories of advice memoranda are
released to the public: memoranda directing dismissal of the charge . . . and
memoranda in closed cases that . . . are released in the General Counsel’s
discretion.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Moreover, the
Second Report does not contain case names. Unless the name of a case discussed
in the Second Report was found independently, the case was assigned a letter,
and this Note refers to it by the letter throughout.
100. SECOND NLRB REPORT, supra note 46, at 2.
101. Id. at 3–6 (citing Case A).
102. Id. at 5. “Using expletives, she stated the Employer had messed up and
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transferred her to a less lucrative position.103 Coworkers and
former coworkers responded, expressing support, anger, and
frustration, and one former coworker suggested that the
employees initiate a class action lawsuit against the employer.104
A few days after making the posting, the employee was
terminated.105 In supporting its finding of concerted activity, the
Division of Advice stated: “[T]he Charging Party’s initial
Facebook statement, and the discussion it generated, . . . clearly
fell within the Board’s definition of concerted activity, which
encompasses employee initiation of group action through the
discussion of complaints with fellow employees.”106
In Case B,107 the Division of Advice found that an employee
was engaged in concerted activity when she posted several
comments on her Facebook page.108 The employee posted the first
comment after a company manager made a sexist remark.109 A
coworker who was with the employee when the manager made
the remark responded to the posting.110 The employee later made
a second series of postings after a coworker was fired, and the
company’s president reprimanded her for getting involved in
coworkers’ work-related problems.111 Subsequently, the employee
was terminated—a termination that the Division of Advice
concluded was due to her “engag[ement] in discussions with her
coworkers about working conditions.”112
Similarly, the Division of Advice found that an employee’s
Facebook activity was concerted in Case C.113 After a coworker
that she was done with being a good employee.” Id. at 3.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 5. A Charging Party is an employee who files a charge against his
or her employer, alleging that the employer committed an unfair labor practice.
107. Id. at 18–20 (citing Case B).
108. Id. at 20.
109. Id. at 18. The employee sent an email about the remark to her
supervisor and a human resources assistant but did not receive responses. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Id. at 20. The Division of Advice characterized the termination as a
“‘pre-emptive strike’ because of the [e]mployer’s fear of what those discussions
might lead to.” Id.
113. Id. at 20–22 (citing Case C).
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was promoted, the employee had separate discussions with two
other coworkers about her disagreement with the promotion.114
She made a Facebook posting reflecting her frustration, and three
coworkers responded in agreement.115 The employer terminated
the employee who made the posting, along with one of the
coworkers who responded, and the employer disciplined the two
other coworkers who responded.116 The activity was concerted,
the Division of Advice reasoned, because the employee’s posting
“sparked a collective dialogue that elicited responses from three
of her coworkers.”117 The Division of Advice noted: “While the
concerted actions expressed in the posts were of a preliminary
nature . . . the movement toward concerted action was halted by
the [e]mployer’s pre-emptive discharge and discipline of all the
employees involved.”118
In Case D,119 the Division of Advice found that an employee’s
Facebook posting constituted concerted activity.120 Before making
the posting, the employee participated in discussions with
coworkers about a superior’s negative attitude and brought the
concern to management’s attention.121 A coworker posted on her
Facebook page “that there had been so much drama” at work, and
an online conversation with coworkers ensued.122 The employee—
who was eventually discharged—responded by stating that “she
hated [her workplace] and couldn’t wait to get out of there”
because of the negative work environment.123 The Division of
Advice concluded that the Facebook activity was concerted
“because it was a continuation of the earlier group action that
included complaints to management . . . and because it was part
of a discussion of employees’ shared concerns.”124

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 22–25 (citing Case D).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 23.
Id.
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Finally, in Case E,125 the Division of Advice found that an
employee’s Facebook postings made during a seven-month period
constituted concerted activity.126 Tension between the employee, a
nurse, and his employer, a hospital, arose after “a recently
discharged hospital employee killed one supervisor and critically
wounded another.”127 After the incident, the employee criticized
his employer publicly—by writing letters to a local newspaper, for
example.128 In addition, the employee made numerous Facebook
postings that referenced an on-going labor dispute, commented
negatively on the employer’s management style, and discussed
management’s mistreatment of employees.129 The postings
received comments from coworkers expressing support.130 The
employer disciplined the employee and later discharged him.131 In
concluding that the postings constituted concerted activity, the
Division of Advice stated that they “were the logical outgrowth of
other employees’ collective concerns or were made with or on the
authority of other employees.”132
2. When Concerted Activity Was Not Present
The Division of Advice found that concerted activity was not
present in the five other cases. In Case F,133 for example, the
Division of Advice found that an employee’s two Facebook
postings did not constitute concerted activity.134 After the
employee’s “supervisor reprimanded her in front of the Regional
Manager for failing to perform a task that she had never been
instructed to perform,” she made a Facebook posting “that
consisted of an expletive and the name of the [e]mployer’s

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 26–30 (citing Case E).
Id. at 28.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 6–8 (citing Case F).
Id. at 7.
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store.”135 One coworker responded by “Liking” the posting.136
Then, the employee made a second posting stating that her
“employer did not appreciate its employees,” to which coworkers
did not respond.137 In the following days, the employee discussed
the incident with her coworkers, and she was fired.138 In
concluding that the Facebook activity was not concerted, the
Division of Advice characterized the postings as “merely an
expression of an individual gripe.”139
In Case G,140 the Division of Advice determined that an
employee did not engage in concerted activity when she “posted
angry profane comments on her Facebook wall” about her
coworkers and employer.141 One coworker responded with
empathy, saying “that she had gone through the same thing.”142
Subsequently, the employer fired the employee.143 The Division of
Advice reasoned that the postings were not concerted because
they “expressed [the employee’s] personal anger with coworkers
and the [e]mployer, were made solely on her own behalf, and did
not involve the sharing of common concerns.”144
Similarly, in Children’s National Medical Center,145 the
Division of Advice found that two Facebook postings did not
constitute concerted activity.146 The first posting expressed the
employee’s frustration with the way that a doctor had treated the
employee, a respiratory therapist, and the second posting
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id.; see also Facebook, Like, http://www.facebook.com/help/like (last
visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“Clicking Like under something you or a friend posts on
Facebook is an easy way to let someone know that you enjoy it, without leaving
a comment.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
137. SECOND NLRB REPORT, supra note 46, at 6 (citing Case F).
138. Id. at 6–7.
139. Id. at 7.
140. Id. at 11–13 (citing Case G).
141. Id. at 11. The employee “had a history of conflict with several
coworkers.” Id.
142. Id. at 12.
143. Id.
144. Id. The Division of Advice characterized the postings as “rants” and
“general profanities.” Id.
145. Id. at 30–32 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA36658 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011)).
146. Id. at 32.
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expressed the employee’s irritation with a coworker who was
sucking his teeth at work.147 The Division of Advice’s analysis of
concertedness was brief because it found that the content of the
postings was not protected.148 Nevertheless, the Division of
Advice stated that even if the first posting were protected, it was
not concerted because it “was merely a personal complaint.”149
In Buel, Inc.,150 the Division of Advice found that an
employee’s Facebook activity was not concerted.151 The employee,
a truck driver, discovered that roads were closed because of the
weather.152 He attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach his employer’s
on-call dispatcher and discussed his inability to reach the
dispatcher with other drivers.153 He also made several Facebook
postings, commenting on the situation.154 One of the employee’s
“Facebook friends,” the employer’s operations manager,
responded critically, and a conversation ensued.155 Following, the
employer revoked the employee’s “status as a leader operator,”
and the employee resigned, claiming he was forced to do so.156
Despite the discussion that the employee had with other drivers
before posting on Facebook, the Division of Advice found that
“there [was] insufficient evidence that his Facebook activity was a
continuation of any collective concerns.”157 Rather, the employee
“was simply expressing his own frustration and boredom about his
inability to reach the on-call dispatcher.”158
Finally, in Frito-Lay, Inc.,159 the Division of Advice found that
an employee was not engaging in concerted activity when he
147. Id. at 30–31.
148. Id. at 31–32.
149. Id. at 32. The Division of Advice characterized the second posting in
similar terms. Id. at 31–32.
150. Id. at 32–34 (citing Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 11-CA-22936 (Div. of Advice
July 28, 2011)).
151. Id. at 32.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 32–33.
156. Id. at 33.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 34–35 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-10882 (Div. of
Advice Sept. 19, 2011)).
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posted on Facebook but was “just venting.”160 The employee, who
was feeling sick, talked to his supervisor about leaving work
early.161 The supervisor told the employee that he could leave early
but would forfeit an attendance point.162 Because the employee did
not want to lose an attendance point, he completed his shift.163
After his shift, the employee made a Facebook posting, for which
he was later discharged, “indicating that it was too bad when your
boss doesn’t care about your health.”164 The Division of Advice
concluded that the Facebook activity was not concerted; it was not
an outgrowth of prior group action, did not attempt to initiate
group action, and did not receive responses from coworkers.165
3. What the Cases in the Second Report Tell Us
The factors that the Division of Advice considered regularly in
its analysis of the First Report’s cases also appeared in its analysis
of the Second Report’s cases. Frequently, the Division of Advice
considered: (1) whether the posting grew out of prior non-Facebook
group activity,166 (2) whether the posting contemplated future nonFacebook group activity,167 (3) whether coworkers responded to the
160. Id. at 35.
161. Id. at 34.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 35.
166. See id. at 35 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-10882, at 4
(Div. of Advice Sept. 19, 2011)) (finding that the postings were not “an
outgrowth of prior employee meetings”); Id. at 33 (citing Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. No.
11-CA-22936, at 4 (Div. of Advice July 28, 2011)) (“Although he had discussed
with other drivers the fact that the on-call dispatcher was not reachable, there
is insufficient evidence that his Facebook activity was a continuation of any
collective concerns.”); Id. at 21 (citing Case C) (“[P]rior to her Facebook postings,
the Charging Party spoke to two coworkers . . . .”); Id. at 23 (citing Case D)
(describing the postings as “a continuation of . . . earlier group action that
included employee complaints to management about the Employer’s Operations
Manager”); Id. at 28 (citing Case E) (describing the postings as a “logical
outgrowth” of prior concerted activity); Id. at 7 (citing Case F) (“[T]he post did
not grow out of a prior discussion . . . with her coworkers.”).
167. See id. at 32 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA36658, at 3 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011)) (“The Charging Party was not seeking
to induce or prepare for group action . . . .”); Id. at 35 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc.,
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posting,168 (4) whether the employee who made the posting
discussed the posting itself with coworkers,169 (5) the intent of the
employee who made the posting, as reflected by the language and
context of the posting,170 and (6) how coworkers interpreted the
posting, as reflected by their responses.171
Furthermore, the Division of Advice considered an
additional factor that it did not consider in the cases discussed
N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-10882, at 3–4 (Div. of Advice Sept. 19, 2011)) (same); Id. at
33 (citing Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 11-CA-22936, at 4 (Div. of Advice July 28,
2011)) (same); Id. at 7 (citing Case F) (“[T]he post contained no language
suggesting that she sought to initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group
action . . . .”); Id. at 12 (citing Case G) (same).
168. See id. at 32 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA36658, at 3 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011)) (“[N]one of her coworkers
responded.”); Id. at 35 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc. N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-10882, at 3
(Div. of Advice Sept. 19 2011)) (“[N]one of his coworkers responded to the
postings with similar concerns.”); Id. at 33 (citing Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 11CA-22936, at 4–5 (Div. of Advice July 28, 2011)) (“[N]one of his coworkers
responded to his complaints about work-related matters.”); Id. at 5 (citing Case
A) (“[C]oworkers and former coworkers responded.”); Id. at 22 (citing Case C)
(“The Charging Party’s Facebook post sparked a collective dialogue that elicited
responses from three of her coworkers . . . .”).
169. See id. at 32 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA36658, at 3 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011)) (“The Charging Party did not discuss
her Facebook post with any of her fellow employees . . . .”); Id. at 33 (citing Buel,
Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 11-CA- 22936, at 3 (Div. of Advice July 28, 2011)) (“The
Charging Party did not discuss his Facebook posts with any of his fellow
employees . . . .”).
170. See id. at 32 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA36658, at 3 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011)) (finding the postings revealed the
employee’s intent to express “a personal complaint about something that had
happened on her shift”); Id. at 35 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA10882, at 4 (Div. of Advice Sept. 19, 2011)) (finding the postings revealed the
employee’s intent to “vent”); Id. at 33 (citing Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 11-CA22936, at 4 (Div. of Advice July 28, 2011)) (finding the postings revealed the
employee’s intent to “express[] his own frustration and boredom while stranded
by the weather”); Id. at 7 (citing Case F) (finding the postings revealed the
employee’s intent to express “an individual gripe”); Id. at 12 (citing Case G)
(finding the postings revealed the employee’s intent to “express[] her personal
anger with coworkers and the Employer”).
171. See id. at 29 (citing Case E) (“[F]ellow employees posted many messages
of support for the Charging Party’s statements and general encouragement for
his activity on his Facebook page . . . .”); Id. at 7 (citing Case F) (“Although one
of her coworkers offered her sympathy and indicated some general
dissatisfaction with her job, [the coworker] did not engage in any extended
discussion with the Charging Party over working conditions or indicate any
interest in taking action with the Charging Party.”).
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by the First Report: whether the firing that resulted from the
employee’s Facebook activity constituted a “pre-emptive” strike.
In other words, sometimes Facebook activity itself does not
quite rise to the level of concerted activity or is concerted only in
a preliminary sense. Nevertheless, the Division of Advice
indicated that it would consider the activity concerted under the
Act if it represented a movement towards concerted activity that
could never occur because of the firing. For example, when
explaining the Division of Advice’s findings in Case C, the
Acting General Counsel stated:
While the concerted actions expressed in the posts were of a
preliminary nature, we concluded that the movement toward
concerted action was halted by the Employer’s pre-emptive
discharge and discipline of all the employees involved in the
Facebook posts. Thus, we concluded that the Employer
unlawfully prevented the fruition of the employees’ protected
concerted activity.172

This “pre-emptive strike” concept relates closely to the second
factor identified in Part III.A.3: whether the posting
contemplated future non-Facebook group activity. The language,
however, is unique to the Second Report and the cases contained
therein, indicating that perhaps the concept is slightly different.
C. The ALJ Cases
1. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.
Until September 2011, an ALJ did not have occasion to apply
the Meyers I standard in a case involving a Facebook firing.173
Other than the First NLRB Report and the Advice Memoranda
summarized therein, little guidance existed on how the standard
172. Id. at 22 (citing Case C); see also id. at 20 (citing Case B) (“We therefore
concluded that Charging Party was discharged . . . as a ‘pre-emptive strike’
because of the Employer’s fear of what those discussions might lead to.”).
173. One reason was choice—the NLRB did not begin issuing Facebook
firing complaints until October 2010. See Complaint & Notice of Hearing, Am.
Med. Response of Conn., Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576 (Region 34 Oct. 27,
2010) (first Facebook firing complaint). Another reason was opportunity—many
Facebook firing cases settled prior to adjudication. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
supra note 40, at 5.
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would apply in the social media context.174 This changed when an
ALJ issued the first decision of its kind in Hispanics United.
Hispanics United held that employees’ Facebook postings
constituted protected concerted activity, making their
termination unlawful under the NLRA.175 Hispanics United of
Buffalo, Inc. (HUB) employed Lydia Cruz-Moore as a domestic
violence social worker.176 Cruz-Moore was often critical of other
HUB employees’ job performance and communicated this
criticism through text messages and in-person conversations.177
In particular, she told one HUB employee, Mariana Cole-Rivera,
of her plans to raise her concerns with HUB’s Executive Director,
Lourdes Iglesias.178 Following this conversation, Cole-Rivera
posted a message on her Facebook page: “‘Lydia Cruz, a coworker
feels that we don’t help our clients enough at HUB I about had it!
My fellow coworkers how do u feel?’”179 Several HUB employees
responded by posting comments.180 After Cruz-Moore complained
to Iglesias about the Facebook activity, he met individually with
five of the employees involved in the Facebook activity and fired
each of them.181
The ALJ—faced with the issue of whether the HUB
employees’ Facebook postings constituted protected concerted
activity—applied the standard of Meyers I and its progeny.182 The
ALJ asserted that the employees “were taking a first step
towards taking group action to defend themselves against the
accusations they could reasonably believe Cruz-Moore was going
to make to management.”183 Thus, the Facebook postings
174. The Acting General Counsel did not issue the Second Report until after
the three ALJ cases discussed in this Note had been decided.
175. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 7–9,
2011 WL 3894520 (Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011). The case is on appeal before
the five-member board.
176. Hispanics United, N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 4.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 4–6. Cole-Rivera responded to some of the comments. Id. at 5–6.
In addition, Cruz-Moore posted: “Marianna stop with ur lies about me I’ll b at
HUB Tuesday.” Id. at 6.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 7–8.
183. Id. at 8–9.
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constituted concerted activity.184 Because the ALJ found that the
other elements of a Section 8 violation were present, he asserted
that HUB had terminated its employees in violation of the Act.185
Although the Board asserted in Meyers I that whether an
activity is concerted is a separate inquiry from whether an
activity is protected,186 the ALJ in Hispanics United fused both
inquiries together and reversed the analysis. The ALJ first
determined that the activity was protected, and then he
determined that the activity was concerted.187 As a consequence,
the ALJ did not provide a thorough rationale for his
determination that the Facebook postings constituted concerted
activity. Interestingly, the ALJ did not address the unique
context in which the activity arose, likely because HUB
“concede[d] that regardless of whether the comments and actions
of the five terminated employees took place on Facebook or
‘around the water cooler’ the result would be the same.”188

184. Id. Before progressing to the ALJ stage, the Division of Advice issued a
memorandum, advising the regional office to issue a complaint. The Division of
Advice, as noted by the Acting General Counsel in the First Report, found the
that the activity involved was concerted: “[T]he Facebook discussion here was a
textbook example of concerted activity, even though it transpired on a social
network platform.” FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 4.
185. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 10, 2011
WL 3894520 (Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011). First, the ALJ determined that HUB
knew of the concerted nature of employees’ activity. See id. at 9 (“[T]he fact that
[HUB] lumped the discriminates together in terminating them, establishes that
[HUB] viewed the five as a group and that their activity was concerted.”).
Second, the ALJ determined that the activity was protected. See id. at 8 (“I
conclude that their Facebook communications with each other, in reaction to a
co-worker’s criticisms of the manner in which HUB employees performed their
jobs, are protected.”). Finally, the ALJ noted HUB’s concession that the
Facebook postings motivated the firings. Id.
186. See Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (“Once an activity is found to
be concerted, an 8(a)(1) violation will be found if, in addition, . . . the concerted
activity was protected by the Act . . . .”) (emphasis added).
187. This is problematic because whether an activity is concerted concerns
the character of the activity, while whether an activity is protected concerns the
content of the activity.
188. Hispanics United, N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 8. It is unclear why
HUB made this concession.
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2. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc.
A few weeks after the Hispanics United decision, another
ALJ issued the second Facebook firing decision. Karl Knauz
Motors held that an employee’s Facebook posting on one topic
constituted protected concerted activity,189 while the employee’s
posting on a different topic did not constitute protected concerted
activity.190 Because the ALJ determined that the latter posting
caused the employee’s termination, the ALJ found that the
discharge did not violate the NLRA.191
The dispute involved Karl Knauz Motors, Inc. (Karl Knauz)
and its employee, Robert Becker, a car salesman at its BMW
dealership.192 The dealership was organizing an “Ultimate
Driving Event” at which it planned to introduce a redesigned
BMW 5 Series automobile.193 Prior to the event, Becker’s
supervisor, Phillip Ceraulo, held a meeting at which he informed
the salespeople of the dealership’s plan to have a hot dog cart at
the event.194 Both during and after the meeting, Becker and other
salespeople allegedly commented on the disconnect between the
hot dog cart and BMW’s status as a luxury brand and the effect
that the disconnect could have on their commissions.195 While at
the event, Becker took pictures of the food, including pictures of
salespeople holding hot dogs.196 He later posted those pictures
with descriptions on his Facebook page, and some of Becker’s
Facebook friends posted comments, to which Becker responded.197
Several days after the event, an accident occurred at a Land
Rover dealership, also owned by Karl Knauz, that was located
adjacent to the BMW dealership.198 Becker took pictures of the
accident and posted pictures, along with comments, on his
189. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 8, 2011 WL
4499437 (Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011).
190. Id. at 9.
191. Id. The case is on appeal before the five-member board.
192. Id. at 1–2.
193. Id. at 2.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 3.
197. Id. at 3–4.
198. See id. at 3 (describing the accident).
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Facebook page.199 Some of Becker’s Facebook friends, including
other Karl Knauz employees, posted comments, to which Becker
responded.200 After Karl Knauz discovered the postings of the
event and the accident, it terminated Becker’s employment.201
Thus, the ALJ had to determine whether Becker’s Facebook
postings of (1) the Ultimate Driving Event (event posting), or
(2) the accident at the Land Rover dealership (accident posting),
or (3) both constituted protected concerted activity, making
Becker’s termination unlawful under the NLRA.202 In applying
the standard of Meyers I and its progeny, the ALJ found that
Becker’s event posting constituted concerted activity:
As both Larsen [another salesperson] and Becker spoke up at
the meeting commenting on what they considered to be the
inadequacies of the food being offered at the event, and the
subject was further discussed by the salespersons after the
meeting, even though only Becker complained further about it
on his Facebook pages without any further input from any
other salesperson, other than the Facebook pictures of [two
other salespeople], I find that it was concerted
activities . . . .203

Because Becker’s individual action was a “‘logical outgrowth of
prior concerted activity,’”204 his individual action was concerted.
In contrast, the ALJ found that Becker’s accident posting did
not constitute concerted activity.205 Supporting his conclusion, the
ALJ emphasized that “[i]t was posted solely by Becker,
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 5–6
202. Id. at 7.
203. Id. at 8. In addition, the ALJ determined that the activity was
protected. See id. (“[I]t was protected . . . as it could have had an effect upon
[Becker’s] compensation.”). Before progressing to the ALJ stage, the Division of
Advice issued a memorandum, advising the regional office to issue a complaint.
The Division of Advice, as noted by the Acting General Counsel in the First
Report, found that the activity involved was concerted: “The Facebook activity
was a direct outgrowth of the earlier discussion among the salespeople that
followed the meeting with management.” FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at
8.
204. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 8, 2011 WL
4499437 (Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011) (quoting NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son,
Inc., 53 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1995)).
205. Id. at 9.
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apparently as a lark, without any discussion with any other
employee.”206 Because the ALJ found that Becker’s accident
posting, rather than his event posting, motivated his discharge,
the ALJ found that Karl Knauz did not terminate Becker in
violation of Section 8 of the Act.207
3. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille
The first ALJ Facebook firing decision of 2012—the third
decision overall—was issued on January 3, 2012. Triple Play held
that two employees engaged in concerted activity when they
responded to a Facebook posting by a former coworker about their
employer’s tax withholding practices.208 Triple Play Sports Bar
and Grille (Triple Play) employed Jillian Sanzone as a waitress
and bartender and Vincent Spinella as a cook.209 When Sanzone
filed her tax returns, she realized that she owed taxes to the
state.210 She talked about the tax issue with coworkers, and her
supervisors arranged a staff meeting to discuss the issue.211
Before the staff meeting took place, a former employee of
Triple Play made the following Facebook posting: “Maybe
someone should do the owners of Triple Play a favor and buy it
from them. They can’t even do the tax paperwork correctly!!! Now
I OWE money . . . Wtf!!!!”212 The posting received a number of
responses from customers and former coworkers, including
Sanzone.213 In addition, the former employee who made the
original posting replied to some of the responses.214 After eleven
responses had been made to the original posting, all expressing
frustration with owing taxes, Sanzone stated: “I owe too. Such an
206. Id. In addition, the ALJ determined that the activity was not protected.
See id. (“It is so obviously unprotected . . . .”).
207. Id.
208. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 8–9,
2012 WL 76862 (Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012). The case is on appeal before the
five-member board.
209. Triple Play, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 2.
210. Id. at 3.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 3–4.
214. Id.
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asshole.”215 Although Spinella did not respond with a textual
comment, he clicked the “Like” button under the initial posting.216
After two supervisors learned of the Facebook posting and the
responses, they fired both Sanzone and Spinella.217
Consequently, the ALJ had to determine whether the two
employees’ Facebook postings constituted protected concerted
activity, making their termination unlawful under the NLRA.218
In answering this question, the ALJ focused on the fact that the
Facebook postings were “part of an ongoing sequence of events”
involving the tax issue.219 Employees of Triple Play had discussed
the matter before the Facebook activity,220 and a meeting was
scheduled to discuss the matter in the near future.221 In addition,
the ALJ notably asserted: “The specific medium in which the
discussion takes place is irrelevant to its protected nature.”222
Therefore, the ALJ concluded that the Facebook activity
constituted concerted activity.223

215. Id.
216. Id. at 4. After clicking “Like,” the text “Vincent VinnyCenz Spinella and
Chelsea Molloy like this” appeared automatically below the original posting. Id.
Spinella testified that he clicked “Like” after the fifth response had been made,
a comment by the person who made the original posting: “It’s all Ralph’s [one of
the supervisor’s] fault. He didn’t do the paperwork right. I’m calling the labor
board to look into it because he still owes me about 2000 in paychecks.” Id.
217. Id. at 4–5.
218. Id. at 8–9.
219. Id. at 8.
220. Id. Thus, the Facebook activity was a “logical outgrowth” of prior
concerted activity. See id. (“[T]he Facebook discussion was part of a sequence of
events, including other, face-to-face employee conversations . . . .”).
221. Id. Thus, the Facebook activity related to the preparation of group
action. See id. (“The employees who posted comments . . . specifically discussed
the issues they intended to raise at [the] upcoming meeting and avenues for
possible complaints to government entities.”).
222. Id. The ALJ’s use of the phrase “protected nature” appears to
encompass both whether the activity is protected and whether the activity is
concerted.
223. Id. Before progressing to the ALJ stage, the Division of Advice issued a
memorandum, advising the regional office to issue a complaint. The Division of
Advice, as noted by the Acting General Counsel in the First Report, found the
that the activity involved was concerted: “[T]he conversation that transpired on
Facebook not only embodied ‘truly group complaints’ but also contemplated
future group activity.” FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 10.
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Perhaps the most interesting part of the ALJ’s discussion
came when she discussed the implications of Spinella clicking
“Like,” rather than responding in text form. The ALJ stated that
clicking the “Like” button “constituted participation in the
discussion that was sufficiently meaningful as to rise to the level
of concerted activity.”224 Because the ALJ determined that the
other elements of a Section 8 violation were present and that the
Facebook activity did not lose the protection of the Act, she found
that Triple Play had terminated both employees in violation of
the Act.225
4. What the ALJ Cases Tell Us
In deciding the previous three cases, the ALJs considered
some of the same factors that the Acting General Counsel and
Division of Advice considered in the two reports and the Advice
Memoranda cited therein. For example, the ALJs in both Triple
Play and Karl Knauz Motors afforded weight to the fact that the
postings grew out of prior non-Facebook activity—factor one.226 In
addition, the ALJs in both Triple Play and Hispanics United
found that the postings contemplated future non-Facebook
activity—factor two.227
224. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 8–9,
2012 WL 76862 (Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012). The ALJ emphasized that “the
Board has never parsed the participation of individual employees in otherwise
concerted conversations, or deemed the protections of Section 7 to be contingent
upon their level of engagement or enthusiasm.” Id. at 9.
225. Id. at 22. In addition to finding that the activity was concerted, the ALJ
determined that the activity was protected. See id. 8 (“It is beyond question that
issues related to wages, including the tax treatment of earnings, are directly
related to the employment relationship and may form the basis for protected
concerted activity . . . .”). The ALJ also found that Triple Play knew that its
employees were engaged in protected concerted activity and that Facebook
activity motivated the firings. Id. at 14–15.
226. See id. at 8 (discussing the in-person conversations between employees
that had taken place before the Facebook posting); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc.,
N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 8, 2011 WL 4499437 (Div. of Judges Sept. 28,
2011) (same).
227. See Triple Play, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 8 (“The employees who
posted comments . . . specifically discussed the issues they intended to raise at
[an] upcoming meeting . . . .”); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 3CA-27872, at 9, 2011 WL 3894520 (Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011) (finding the
employees’ postings represented “a first step towards taking group action to
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Furthermore, at least implicitly, the ALJs focused on the
intent of those involved—factors four and five. For example, in
Hispanics United, the ALJ indicated that the original poster and
the coworkers who responded intended “to defend themselves
against . . . accusations.”228 The Hispanics United decision
suggests that if the intent of an employee who makes a Facebook
posting aligns with the intent of the coworkers who respond, the
Facebook activity is likely concerted. In both Triple Play and Karl
Knauz Motors—cases that presented different factual
circumstances than Hispanics United229—the ALJs focused on the
intent of the parties to continue a discussion that had begun
previously or to prepare for a future discussion that was planned
before the commencement of the Facebook activity.230
The ALJs, however, did not afford nearly as much
significance to two of the factors identified in Part III.A.3—
factors three and four. Although the ALJs in all three cases
mentioned whether coworkers responded to the initial posting,
they did not emphasize coworker responses as essential to their
analysis. In fact, in Karl Knauz Motors, the ALJ found that the
posting to which coworkers did respond—the accident posting—
was not concerted,231 while the posting to which coworkers did not
respond—the event posting—was concerted.232 Moreover, none of
defend themselves against the accusations they could reasonably believe [their
coworker] was going to make to management”).
228. Hispanics United, N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 8–9.
229. In Triple Play, the person who made the original posting was not a
current employee of the company charged with an unfair labor practice, but a
former one. Triple Play, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 3. In Karl Knauz Motors,
the posting that the ALJ found was concerted received no coworker responses.
Karl Knauz Motors, N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 8.
230. See Triple Play, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 8 (finding that the
employees’ responses to the original posting indicated an intent to “discuss[] the
issues they intended to raise at [the] upcoming meeting and avenues for possible
complaints to government entitles”); Karl Knauz, N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at
8 (finding that the event posting reflected an intent to continue expressing
complaints about management’s choice of food expressed previously at a
meeting).
231. See Karl Knauz Motors, N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 3 (stating that
multiple coworkers responded to the accident posting).
232. See id. at 7 (“[E]ven though only Becker complained further about it on
his Facebook pages without any further input from any other salesperson . . . I
find that it was concerted . . . .”).
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the ALJs considered whether the person who made the original
posting discussed the posting itself with coworkers.
Finally, although the ALJs did not use the “pre-emptive
strike” terminology that the Division of Advice employed,233 the
ALJ in Hispanics United invoked the concept by stating: “By
discharging the discriminatees . . . [the employer] prevented them
[from] taking any further group action.” 234
IV. Why the Concerted Activity Standard Is Problematic in the
Social Media Context
Many have accused the Board of playing politics, arguing
that the Board’s decision to enter into the social media realm is
part of a larger pro-union effort to expand its role.235 Still, others
have argued that the Board’s role in enforcing the NLRA has
never been more important, given the decline in union
membership that has occurred over the past few decades.236
Politics aside, however, there are problems with the way that the
Board has applied the traditional concerted activity standard in
the emerging context of social media.
A. Where the Board Draws the Line
The root of the difficulty in applying the standard is the same
in the social media context as it is in other contexts: determining
233. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
234. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 9, 2011
WL 3894520 (Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011).
235. See Dave Jamieson, Wilma Liebman, Outgoing NLRB Chair, Finds
‘Silver Lining’ in Political Rancor, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2011, 9:09 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/05/wilma-liebman-nlrb-chairwomaninterview_n_947258.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“Corporations and their
allies have decried the board as ‘out of control’ during Liebman’s tenure as
chairwoman.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Those who
argue that the Board is “out of control” point to other recent Board actions, in
conjunction with those related to social media. Id.
236. See William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First
Century: Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 267
(2002) (“As union representation continues to decline, particularly in the private
sector, a broad interpretation and application of section 7 in the nonunion
workplace is even more important today than it was ten or twenty years ago.”).
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the point at which individual activity transforms into concerted
activity. As the Supreme Court noted in NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems, Inc.,237 challenging issues often arise concerning “the
precise manner in which particular actions of an individual
employee must be linked to the actions of fellow employees”238 in
order for the individual action to be concerted. On the one hand,
if the Board interprets and applies the Meyers I standard too
broadly, the standard will lose all meaning. On the other hand, if
the Board interprets and applies the standard too narrowly, the
Board will fail to effectuate the Act’s purposes. To avoid these
undesirable alternatives, the Board has attempted to draw a line
between individually initiated activity that is concerted and that
which is not.
In drawing this line, the Board distinguishes between
situations in which an individual acts with the “intent[] to enlist
the support of other employees in a common endeavor”239 and
situations in which that intent is lacking.240 In Mushroom
Transportation Co.,241 an oft-cited opinion, the Third Circuit
explained that “a conversation may constitute concerted activity
although it involves only a speaker and a listener.”242 However,
this speaker-listener concept has limits:
Activity which consists of mere talk must, in order to be
protected, be talk looking toward group action. If its only
purpose is to advise an individual as to what he could or
should do without involving fellow workers or union
representation to protect or improve his own status or working
position, it is an individual, not a concerted activity, and, if it
looks forward to no action at all, it is more than likely to be
mere “griping.”243

Thus, “mere griping” is the antithesis of concerted activity and is
not protected by the Act.244 The Board has used this concerted
237. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
238. Id. at 831.
239. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 888 (1986).
240. See id. at 885 (stating that “an employee’s activities engaged in ‘solely
by and on behalf of the employee himself,’” do not constitute concerted activity).
241. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
242. Id. at 685.
243. Id.
244. See Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the
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activity–mere griping dichotomy to guide its analysis of Facebook
firing cases. In a press release accompanying the Second Report,
the Board emphasized: “An employee’s comments on social media
are generally not protected if they are mere gripes not made in
relation to group activity among employees.”245
B. Why the Board’s Line Drawing Is Problematic
Stating that “mere griping” does not constitute concerted
activity is nothing new.246 The social media forum, however,
presents new challenges to those attempting to distinguish
between concerted activity and mere griping. First, social media
is, as its name suggests, social. Because it necessarily involves
interaction to varying degrees, almost any individual action in a
social media forum could be considered concerted.247 Therefore, in
cases involving social media, it is easier to establish the “linkage
to group action”248 that the Board requires. After all, employees
are often Facebook friends with coworkers. If an employee makes
a Facebook posting, coworkers can read the posting without
responding, “Like” the posting, or respond in text form. If
Requirement of Concert Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 286, 290 (1981) (“[W]hen an individual employee protests alone, without
any consultation with and authorization by fellow employees, his legal rights
under section 7 may be drastically curtailed, even when he purports to voice the
concerns of others but especially when he is speaking only for himself . . . .”).
245. Press Release, NLRB, Acting General Counsel Issues Second Social
Media Report (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/acting-general-counselissues-second-social-media-report (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
246. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 244, at 290 (“The prevailing principle
of law—endorsed both by the courts of appeals and the NLRB—is that section 7
does not protect ‘personal gripes’ by individual employees.”).
247. See John Hyman, Is the NLRB Backing Off Its Position on Social Media
as Protected, Concerted Activity?, LEXISNEXIS COMMUNITIES: LABOR &
EMPLOYMENT COMMUNITY (Jan. 10, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/
community/labor-employment-law/blogs/labor-employment-commentary/archive/
2012/01/10/is-the-nlrb-backing-off-its-position-on-social-media-as-protected-con
certed-activity.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“One of my key concerns about
the NLRB’s foray into regulating workplace social media is that, by its very
nature, social media is concerted . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
248. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 884 (1986).
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concerted activity need only involve “a speaker and a listener”249
and an intent on the speaker’s part to initiate group action, it
becomes difficult to imagine when Facebook activity concerning
working conditions would not fit within the current definition of
concerted activity. This is especially true given that the Board
has indicated neither the degree of linkage to group action that it
requires, nor how it determines employee intent, in the social
media context.
At the same time, social media lends itself to griping. As
anyone with a Facebook page knows, many Facebook users
employ their page as a platform to air personal complaints—both
work-related and otherwise. Facebook friends can respond to
such complaints—offering sympathy or humor—with informality
and ease. Consequently, Facebook does not fit into the present
concerted activity standard easily because the forum is inherently
concerted, yet it fosters activity that is the opposite of concerted:
griping.
V. Possible Approaches
When thinking about how the Board can increase certainty
in this area of law, it is important to be realistic. First, the NLRA
is likely here to stay.250 Second, it is unlikely that the Board will
completely re-construe Section 7 of the Act.251 Its current
249. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
250. See Corbett, supra note 236, at 264 (“While there may be a need to
substantially overhaul the body of law regulating the employment relationship
in the United States, it is doubtful that such a project will be undertaken by
lawmakers absent an economic catastrophe.”). One could argue that the United
States has experienced an economic catastrophe in the past few years. However,
lawmakers’ response to the current economic crisis will likely be different from
lawmakers’ response to the Great Depression—out of which the NLRA was
born—because of the recent political controversies surrounding the Board’s use
of power. Instead of overhauling the NLRA completely, lawmakers will likely
continue the trend of enacting more individual employment rights laws, if they
legislate in this area at all. Id.
251. Christine Neylon O’Brien, The First Facebook Firing Case Under
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act: Exploring the Limits of Labor Law
Protection for Concerted Communication on Social Media, 45 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 29, 33 (2011) (“At the moment, it seems as though the current NLRB is
poised to adapt existing legal doctrines to craft new rules and remedies
regarding employer rules and restrictions concerning employee use of . . . social

THE VIRTUAL WATER COOLER

1753

construction of the Section, as reflected by the Meyers I standard,
endured a challenge by the D.C. Circuit252 and has remained for
over twenty-five years. Consequently, the three approaches that I
suggest all work within the Board’s current framework.
A. Addressing the Problem at the Front-End
In addition to resolving the concerted activity issue in
Facebook firing cases, the Board often determines the legality of
employers’ social media policies and other rules in employers’
handbooks.253 As the Board stated in Lafayette Park Hotel,254 if an
employer maintains rules that “are likely to have a chilling effect
on Section 7 rights, the Board may conclude that their
maintenance is an unfair labor practice, even absent evidence of
enforcement.”255 To determine whether a rule has an
impermissible chilling effect, the Board examines whether
“(1) employees would reasonably construe the language [of the
rule] to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated
in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.”256
The ALJs in both Triple Play and Karl Knauz Motors
examined employer rules in light of the above factors. In Triple
Play, the ALJ analyzed the employer’s social media policy and
concluded that the policy did not violate the Act.257 In contrast,
the ALJ in Karl Knauz Motors found that rules in the employer’s
handbook did violate the Act.258 Interestingly, the ALJ addressed
media sites.”).
252. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
253. See, e.g., Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at
20–22, 2011 WL 76862 (Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012) (analyzing the employer’s
social media policy); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 9–
11, 2011 WL 4499437 (Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011) (analyzing provisions in
the employer’s handbook).
254. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998).
255. Id. at 825.
256. Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004). This
inquiry is appropriate when a “rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected
by Section 7.” Id. If a rule restricts Section 7 activity explicitly, the Board will
find a violation of the Act without further inquiry. Id. at 646.
257. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 22.
258. Karl Knauz Motors, N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 11. The ALJ found
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the lawfulness of the rules even after finding that the employer
did not discharge the employee because of the event posting—the
posting that the ALJ found constituted protected concerted
activity.259
One approach that the Board could take is to promulgate a
model social media policy through its rulemaking process.260
Ideally, the promulgation of a model policy would lead to less
Facebook firing complaints and subsequent adjudication because
it would increase certainty for both employers and employees.
When an employer became aware of employee Facebook activity
that concerned the employer, he or she could analyze the activity
in terms of how it fit within the contours of the model policy. The
employer could then take action, or refrain from taking action,
based on his or her determination of whether the employee
activity violated the model policy. Because the employer’s
determination would be based on a lawful model policy that
would guide the employer’s decisionmaking, less adjudication of
the lawfulness of employee discipline or discharge would likely
result. The promulgation of a model policy would also benefit
employees by informing their judgment when they use social
media.
This approach would address the concerted activity problem
at the front-end. The model policy would be preventative, in that
it would hopefully lead to fewer unfair labor practice disputes in
the first place. As a consequence, the Board would be called on
less often to construe the concerted activity provision of
Section 7 in the social media context.
the following rules unlawful: (1) a rule prohibiting employees from “be[ing]
disrespectful or use[ing] profanity or any other language which injures the
reputation of the dealership” and (2) rules “prohibit[ing] employees from
participating in interviews with, or answering inquiries concerning employees
from, practically anybody.” Id. at 9.
259. Id. at 9 (finding that the accident posting, which did not constitute
protected concerted activity, caused the discharge). Moreover, the ALJ
addressed the rules even though the employer rescinded them voluntarily prior
to the hearing. Id. at 11.
260. In its Third Report, the Board analyzed seven social media policies.
THIRD NLRB REPORT, supra note 53. Perhaps the NLRB could use the one policy
that it deemed lawful in its entirety as a starting point to formulate a model
policy. See id. at 19–24 (explaining why the policy was lawful and providing a
copy of the policy).
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This approach is not without problems, however. First, the
model policy would not eliminate disputes altogether because
employers and employees could misinterpret or misapply the
policy, and the Board would have to resolve those disputes.
Second, the Board tends to favor adjudication over
rulemaking,261 a preference that has a persuasive rationale in
certain circumstances.262 Finally, given the controversy
surrounding the Board’s recent actions,263 the Board may not be
willing to risk the possibility of more backlash that may result
from a visible use of power.
B. Addressing the Problem Head-On
Most likely, the Board will continue to address the problem
head-on, by attempting to clarify through adjudication how the
Act’s concerted activity provision—as interpreted by the Board in
Meyers I and Meyers II—applies in cases involving social media.
The Board’s present attempts at clarification, however, have not
provided the guidance that employers and employees need. While
the Board provided details of social media cases in its reports,264
it neither identified nor explained the commonalities among the
cases that it found significant. Likewise, the Board did not
distinguish the cases from each other to show how the presence
261. See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in
Administrative Law Exile: Problems With Its Structure and Function and
Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2017 (2009) (stating that the Board
“eschews notice-and-comment rulemaking”). However, the Board has engaged in
rulemaking recently. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Adopts Rules to
Speed Unionization Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, at B5 (describing new rules
adopted by the NLRB that “speed up unionization elections”).
262. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (stating that an “agency may
not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant
rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule.”).
263. See Kathleen Furey McDonough, Labor: Political Controversy
Surrounds the NLRB, INSIDE COUNSEL (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.inside
counsel.com/2012/01/09/labor-political-controversy-surrounds-the-nlrb
(last
visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“In a political environment mired in controversy, the
National Labor Relations Board . . . is one of the federal agencies receiving more
than the usual dose of criticism.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
264. See FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45; SECOND NLRB REPORT, supra
note 46.
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or absence of a certain fact affected its analysis of concerted
activity.
Because the evaluation of Facebook firing cases is factspecific,265 identifying factors unique to the social media context
that tend to indicate concertedness, or lack thereof, could help
remedy the uncertainty. This Note identifies factors that the
Board seemed to consider significant to its analysis of concerted
activity in Facebook firing cases.266 A similar identification of
factors by the Board could help organize and guide the Board’s
analysis in future cases and provide clarity for both employers
and employees.
C. Addressing the Problem at the Back-End
Even if the Board finds that an employee’s Facebook activity
constitutes protected concerted activity, the employee may
nevertheless lose the protection of the Act under one of the
Board’s several loss-of-protection standards. For example, in
Atlantic Steel Co.,267 the Board asserted: “[E]ven an employee
who is engaged in concerted protected activity can, by
opprobrious conduct, lose the protection of the Act.”268 Moreover,
statements that constitute protected concerted activity but are
disloyal can lose the protection of the Act if “they are made ‘at a
critical time in the initiation of the company’s’ business
and . . . constitute ‘a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the
quality of the company’s product and its business policies, in a
manner reasonably calculated to harm the company’s reputation
and reduce its income.’”269
265. See Melanie Trottman, For Angry Employees, Legal Cover for Rants,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702037
10704577049822809710332.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (quoting the
Board’s Acting General Counsel who “‘stress[ed] that each of these cases is very
factual’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
266. See supra Parts III.A.3, III.B.3, and III.C.4.
267. Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979).
268. Id. at 816. “The decision as to whether the employee has crossed that
line depends on several factors: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject
matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and
(4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair
labor practice.” Id.
269. Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1252 (2007) (quoting
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Perhaps the Board could address the concerted activity
problem by applying existing loss-of-protection standards more
strictly to employee activity in the social media context or by
developing a social media specific loss-of-protection standard. If
the Board construes the Meyers I standard broadly when
applying it in cases involving social media,270 it may be
appropriate for the Board to apply a more stringent loss-ofprotection standard subsequently to ensure that the activity in
question is activity that Congress intended for the NLRA to
protect. Social media cases warrant such a stringent application
because social media alters the mix of employer and employee
interests involved.271 In addition, the Board’s notice posting
rule272 will lessen the long-standing concern that many, if not
most, non-unionized employees are unaware of their rights under
the NLRA.273 Because the rule alleviates this concern, it is
reasonable to require employees to conform their actions more
closely to what the Act requires in order to obtain the Act’s
protection.

NLRB v. Elec. Workers Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472
(1953)).
270. This broad construction could be intentional or unintentional. As
explained previously, it is difficult to apply the Meyers I standard in the social
media context because social media inherently involves some degree of
interaction yet fosters griping. See supra Part IV.B.
271. See O’Brien, supra note 251, at 47 n.83 (“[E]mployee use of social media
to vent discontent is more likely to extend beyond the workplace and damage a
company’s reputation than an on-site verbal confrontation.”); Trottman, supra
note 265 (discussing the reputational concerns that online postings implicate).
272. Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug. 30, 2011). The rule requires “most private-sector
employers . . . to post a notice advising employees of their rights under the
National Labor Relations Act.” NLRB, Employee Rights Notice Posting,
http://www.nlrb.gov/poster (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
273. See Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for Informing
Employees of Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 431, 433 (1995) (“American workers are largely ignorant of their rights
under the NLRA, and this ignorance stands as an obstacle to the effective
exercise of such rights.”).
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VI. Conclusion

When introducing the bill that eventually became the NLRA,
the bill’s sponsor, Senator Robert F. Wagner, stated: “When
employees are denied the freedom to act in concert even when
they desire to do so, they cannot exercise a restraining influence
upon the wayward members of their own groups, and they cannot
participate in our national endeavor to coordinate production and
purchasing power.”274 While emphasizing the importance of
providing employees with an enforceable right to engage in
concerted activity, Senator Wagner nevertheless acknowledged:
“[E]mployers are tremendously handicapped when it is
impossible to determine exactly what their rights are. Everybody
needs a law that is precise and certain.”275
The need for precision and certainty is as great today as it
was then. Precision and certainty in the Act’s application benefits
both employees and employers and creates confidence in the
Board. Because the Board’s foray into Facebook firing cases is
recent, it would be unrealistic to expect the Board to have a
ready-made solution to the issues that the social media context
presents. Still, the Board must begin to acknowledge the
differences that exist between the virtual water cooler and the
traditional water cooler, and it must devise an approach. This
Note presents three approaches—approaches that the Board can
implement individually or in concert—formulated with an
understanding of the interests involved and the context’s distinct
attributes.

274. 79 CONG. REC. 2371, 2371 (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner).
275. Id. The act that preceded the NLRA, the National Industrial Recovery
Act, conferred on employees similar rights to engage in concerted activities, but
it did not contain an enforcement mechanism. Id.

